[MUD-Dev] Re: AR's idea database

[James Wilson <jwilson#rochester,rr.com>]

On Sat, 19 Sep 1998, Oliver Jowett wrote:
>Abandoned Reality's idea tracking system database is now accessible at:
>
>http://abandoned.org:4448/its

Lots of good stuff there. Some item-specific observations:

#4096, on objects as spell repositories (<url:
http://abandoned.org:4448/its/4096>) is along the lines of
a magic system I sketched once, which was based on
the system in Zelazny's second 'Amber' series. Also there
was some talk in Dragon magazine about 'one-off' spells
living in objects and dissipated by use. (The same article
talked about 'spell objects' that allowed a mage to cast the
same spell over and over without rememorization, which is
of course only applicable in a vancian magic system.) This 
could be a good  way to enable lower-level mages to 
participate a bit in the magic-item economy, although of 
course the big items would  have to wait - balance is always 
a bit tricky when it comes to mages.

#4014 (<url: http://abandoned.org:4448/its/4104> (and a parallel
thread on the Armageddon board) pose an interesting problem: 
how can one properly model objects masking one another? The 
example given is of a cloak, where apparently the cloak is 
supposed to be masking everything else worn on the body. 
However, if one wears anything, something (be it your aureolae or
your wife-beater shirt) will be masked to the degree by which the
outer object masks it, which might not be a _perfect_ mask
(imagine a halter top over chainmail). Also, presumably after 
a certain period of time and abuse a cloak would develop some
holes, through which one's nudity, armor, glowing energy-body
(anybody here see 'Cocoon'?), whatever, could be visible. 
This seems to be a complicated problem for the realists.

#4105 <url: http://abandoned.org:4448/its/4105> reflects our 
previous discussions on memory. Here it is a limited example
(Bob draws the sword of ass-kicking and thermonuclear decapitation.
Bob pokes you amusingly with his sword.) but one which clearly
extends to 'I know X, so I perceive Y differently'. The limited
example is easy to fix with a first-impression/subsequent-impression
distinction; the general problem is (I think) a candidate for
double dispatch, i.e. Bob's perception of Y is a function of Bob's
memory and Y's state, both of which change over time.

James